Although long-term care is a substantial financial risk for retired households, only about 10 percent purchase insurance, with many of the remainder relying on Medicaid. Faced with rising Medicaid expenditures on long-term care, states have attempted to encourage the purchase of private long-term care insurance through partnership programs that exempt purchasers of qualifying policies from the Medicaid asset test. Using numerical optimization techniques, and assuming plausible preference parameters, we show that the programs will only increase insurance coverage among single males by 5 percent and single females by 4 percent. Most of the program benefits will go to those who would have purchased non-partnership long-term care insurance anyway. Thus, the cost of the subsidy will exceed the savings in Medicaid costs.
Introduction
The cost of nursing home care represents a significant financial risk for elderly Americans. Brown and Finkelstein (2008) estimate that 27 percent of men and 44 percent of women will enter nursing home at some point after age 65. Among those who do, 33 percent of men and 42 percent of women will spend more than a year in a nursing home. MetLife Mature Market Institute (2012) reports that the average cost of a semi-private room in a nursing home was $214 per day, or $78,110 annually, in 2011. Despite this very considerable financial risk, few Americans purchase long-term care insurance. Many households lack the resources to pay out of pocket and turn to Medicaid, the health insurance program for the indigent. The National Health Policy Forum (2013) reports that in 2011 Medicaid paid for 62.3 percent of total longterm care expenditure of $210.9 billion. Concerned at spiraling Medicaid costs, a number of states have introduced long-term care insurance partnership programs. Their goal is to reduce the financial pressure on Medicaid by encouraging individuals to purchase private long-term care insurance.
Using numerical optimization techniques, this paper investigates the impact of the above partnership programs on long-term care insurance coverage and Medicaid costs. As in Brown and Finkelstein (2008) , the analysis focuses on optimal behavior of single individuals, given assumed preference parameters. We show that, under our assumption of optimizing behavior, these programs will increase coverage rates by only 4 to 5 percentage points. A typical induced male purchaser is someone around the 70 th wealth percentile. Prior to purchasing insurance,
Medicaid would pay about 36 percent of his long-term care costs. With partnership coverage, the Medicaid share would halve to 18 percent. But this saving is more than offset by an increase in Medicaid expenditure on those who currently purchase non-partnership policies but who will switch to more advantageous partnership policies. For example, the Medicaid share of the longterm care costs of a male at the 80 th percentile of the wealth distribution would increase from zero to 3 percent before the introduction of the partnership program to 14 percent afterwards, when he switches from a non-partnership to a partnership policy. We estimate that each onedollar saving in Medicaid costs requires partnership subsidies of $1.68 to $2.30 for single males and $4.10 to $5.38 for single females.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines the financing of long-term care in the United States and describes the history and current rules of the long-term care insurance partnership programs. Section 2 reviews previous research. Section 3 presents the intertemporal optimization model. Section 4 presents our results, and section 5 concludes.
Financing Long-term Care in the United States
Social insurance programs cover the cost of long-term care in only the following circumstances:
Nursing home care. Medicare, the public health insurance program for the elderly, covers nursing care for no more than 100 days, and only if this care is in a skilled nursing facility and follows a hospital stay of more than three consecutive days. Although the cost of long-term care exceeds the financial resources of most households, report that only about 10 percent of individuals over age 60 were covered by private long-term care insurance in the year 2000, with coverage being strongly positively 1 The income and assets of married couples are subject to less restrictive spousal protection rules designed to prevent the impoverishment of the community spouse. Married couples must also consider the impact of long-term care costs on the consumption of the surviving spouse. So our estimates of the cost of the partnership program may not apply to married couples. 2 A qualifying individual must satisfy the four following conditions: 1) he must be home bound, 2) his doctor must decide that medical care is required at home and make a care plan, 3) he must need intermittent skilled nursing care, and 4) the home health agency providing the care must be Medicare approved.
correlated with income. 3 Policies provide a daily maximum level or increasing benefit for either an unlimited or specified duration, so purchasers are exposed to the risk of care costs increasing more rapidly than expected. Policies are guaranteed renewable, but insurers can and do apply to their state insurance regulators for permission to increase premiums, so that purchasers are exposed to the risk of sudden and sometimes large premium increases. Premiums do not differ by gender, even though women are at much greater risk than men of requiring care. In consequence, premium loads are much higher for men than for women. estimate that loads average 50 percent for men and minus 6 percent for women. 4 Even so, coverage rates for men and women are similar.
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Concerned at rising Medicaid costs, states have both subsidized the purchase of longterm care insurance by giving premiums favorable treatment under the state income tax code and have also introduced so-called long-term care insurance partnership programs, the focus of this paper. 6 Participants in these programs purchase long-term care insurance policies with benefits payable for a limited duration, typically three years. Once policy benefits are exhausted, participants claim Medicaid, but are subject to less stringent asset protection rules. The programs exempt all the assets of purchasers of "total asset protection" policies, although they are still subject to the Medicaid income test. The assets of purchasers of "dollar-for-dollar" policies are protected up to the amount of the private insurance benefit paid. When policies are purchased under a hybrid program, the type of protection depends on the initial amount of coverage purchased. 
Previous Research
Previous research into the impact of Medicaid and tax subsidies on the long-term care insurance purchase decision falls into two categories, calculations of optimal behavior, given assumed preference parameters, and empirical studies. Pauly (1990) provided a theoretical explanation of rational non-purchase of long-term care insurance in the presence of Medicaid.
He showed that even though it provided incomplete insurance, it could crowd out private insurance even among individuals at relatively low risk of spending down to Medicaid. Brown and Finkelstein (2008) constructed an intertemporal optimization model of the long-term care insurance purchase decision faced by single individuals. They showed that
Medicaid crowd-out is sufficient to explain a large part of the lack of demand. For plausible preference parameters, they found only the very wealthy would be willing to pay for private long-term care insurance because much of the benefit accrues to the government in the form of lower Medicaid expenditure rather than to the individual in the form of higher consumption. Also using HRS data, Shah Goda (2011) studied the impact of state-level income tax subsidies on the demand for long-term care insurance. She estimated that the average tax subsidy raised coverage rates by 30 percent, but that the increase was concentrated among asset-rich individuals at relatively low risk of becoming Medicaid eligible so that each dollar of subsidy yielded only 84 cents in Medicaid savings. Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein (2007) show that long-term care insurance coverage is higher in states with less generous Medicaid spousal protection rules, suggesting that asset protection influences the long-term care insurance purchase decision.
Using HRS data, Chan and Sun (2011) estimate a structural model of the long-term care insurance purchase decision by single individuals. They conclude that individuals have only a modest preference for higher quality non-Medicaid care. They find that premium subsidies would substantially increase insurance coverage, but that the reduction in Medicaid expenditure would be insufficient to offset the subsidy cost, findings that are consistent with those of the reduced form models discussed above. Finally, using HRS data, Lin and Prince (2012) exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the dates states introduced partnership programs and conclude that any effect on coverage was both small and concentrated among wealthy individuals at relatively low risk of becoming dependent on Medicaid.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2005) reported that more than half of purchasers in California, Connecticut, and Indiana had assets in excess of $350,000 and more than half had monthly incomes in excess of $5,000. These averages indicate that the programs are attracting more well-to-do households that are at relatively low risk of becoming Medicaid eligible. The GAO study did not investigate the impact on coverage, and in particular whether they had resulted in an increase in coverage relative to other states that did not operate a program.
The above evidence notwithstanding, appears to be a widespread belief that the 
Model
Using numerical optimization techniques, this paper evaluates the impact of dollar-fordollar and total asset protection partnership programs on the amounts single individuals would hypothetically be willing to pay for long-term care insurance and the corresponding impact of Medicaid expenditure, given assumed preference parameters.
Our model follows that of Brown and Finkelstein (2008) . In each month, the individual can be in one of five states, at home receiving no care, at home receiving home health care, living in an assisted living facility, living in a nursing home, or dead. Transition probabilities vary with age and gender and are based on Robinson (2002) . We calculate insurance premiums by applying estimates of market loads of 50 percent for men and -6 percent for women to actuarially fair premiums calculated using the Robinson (2002) model.
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The individual derives utility from consumption, . In a nursing home or assisted living facility, the individual also derives utility from food and shelter that would otherwise need to be paid out-of-pocket. The consumer's problem is, therefore, to maximize:
where is the probability of being in state at time t, and is a rate of time preference.
Individuals face the following budget constraint when not eligible for Medicaid:
10 The Robinson (2002) model is based on data from the 1982 and 1984 National Long-Term Care Survey.
Although there is evidence that the incidence of activity of daily living (ADL) limitations, a key determinant of long-term care utilization, has declined over the last 30 years, updating the model is beyond the scope of this paper. Expense loads depend on premiums, claim rates, and the interest rate used to discount premiums and claims. Although long-term care insurance premiums have increased substantially in recent years, policies have an extremely long duration, and much of the increase likely reflects declines in nominal interest rates.
where is wealth, is annuitized income, and are long-term insurance policy benefits and premiums, is the cost of long-term care, and is the rate of interest. Policy benefits are capped at the actual level of long-term care costs incurred. Premiums are only paid when living at home and not receiving care. The uninsured receive zero policy benefits and pay zero premiums. There is the usual no-borrowing constraint.
If the individual is eligible for Medicaid, Medicaid pays an amount equal to:
the cost of long-term care minus the amount by which annuitized income exceeds a consumption floor, which varies with care status , minus long-term care insurance policy benefits, minus the lesser of zero and the amount by which wealth exceeds , the wealth floor.
If the individual purchases a partnership policy, the Medicaid asset test is relaxed. After the expiry of the policy benefit period, Medicaid pays:
the cost of care, minus the amount by which the individual's income exceeds the Medicaid income floor. In the case of a dollar-for-dollar policy, , the revised wealth floor, equals the total benefits paid under the policy, plus the $2,000 disregard. In the case of a total asset protection policy, it is set to infinity.
The remaining parameter values of our model are as follows. The terminal age T is set at 105. The real interest rate and the rate of time preference are both 3 percent. 11 General inflation is 2.5 percent a year, and real medical cost inflation is 1.5 percent a year. 
Results
We calculate willingness to pay for the most commonly purchased non-partnership policy type, providing a daily benefit of $158 in 2011 dollars for a duration of three years, with 5 percent inflation protection (America's Health Insurance Plans 2012). To explore the impact of tail risk, we then calculate willingness to pay for a policy with the above daily benefit, but with an unlimited duration of coverage. To explore the impact of benefit amount, we also calculate willingness to pay for three-year and unlimited duration policies with a larger daily benefit of $241, the minimum daily benefit required for total asset protection in 2011. Finally, we investigate the impact of the partnership program by calculating willingness to pay for dollar-fordollar partnership policies with daily benefit amounts of $158 and $241, and a total asset protection partnership policy with a daily benefit amount of $241. In all cases, we assume market loads.
To summarize, the policy types studied are as follows:
• Policy 1: Typical non-partnership policy, three-year coverage, $158 daily benefit.
• Policy 2: Non-partnership policy, lifetime coverage, $158 daily benefit.
• Policy 3: Non-partnership policy, three-year coverage, $241 daily benefit.
• Policy 4: Non-partnership policy, lifetime coverage, $241 daily benefit.
• Policy 5: Partnership policy, three-year coverage, with dollar-for-dollar protection thereafter, $158 daily benefit. • Policy 6: Partnership policy, three-year coverage, with dollar-for-dollar protection thereafter, $241 daily benefit.
12 In the interests of computational feasibility, we assume, when analyzing dollar-for-dollar policies that care costs equal or exceed the daily policy benefit. This enables us to model the policy as protecting some dollar amount of assets -which is the way the policies are usually marketed. MetLife Mature Market Institute (2012) report that the costs in New York State are somewhat higher at $125,560, $46,404, and $22, respectively. MetLife does not report the cost of skilled nursing care in 2011, and we assume that it increased at the same rate as the cost of home health care. 13 Some states pay a somewhat higher SSI benefit. The $674, plus the $30 personal needs allowance equals the $704 consumption floor.
• Policy 7: Partnership policy, three-year coverage, with total asset protection thereafter, $241 daily benefit.
In our base case, we assume the rate of interest and the rate of time preference both equal 3 percent. We consider an alternative in which the rate of interest is 1 percent, reflecting the current low interest rate environment, but retain the assumption of a 3 percent rate of time preference.
Figures 1A and 1B show willingness to pay for the Policies 1, 4, 5 and 7 for males and females respectively, assuming a 3 percent rate of interest. We do not report willingness-to-pay when it is worse than losing all financial wealth.
Men. Men at the 71 st wealth percentile and above have a positive willingness to pay for the typical policy, one that provides a $158 daily benefit for a three-year duration. Their willingness to pay for a three-year duration policy with a $241 daily benefit is almost identical and is not shown on the figure. Men at the 72 nd wealth percentile and above have a positive willingness to pay for an unlimited duration $241 daily benefit policy. Their willingness to pay for an unlimited duration $158 daily benefit policy is almost identical and is not shown on the figure.
The wealthy place a substantially higher value on an unlimited duration than on a threeyear duration policy. They value the ability to insure against the risk of catastrophic long-term care costs. This finding is in contrast with observed behavior, with many purchasers opting for a limited duration of coverage. But men at low wealth percentiles prefer the less expensive threeyear duration policy to the more expensive unlimited duration policy, while still preferring to purchase neither,.
Men at all wealth percentiles prefer the $158 daily benefit partnership policy to the corresponding three-year duration policy. The partnership policy provides superior benefits at the same premium. But the additional willingness to pay is strongly related to wealth. Those at low wealth percentiles place almost no value on the additional insurance. Those in the top wealth percentiles, who stand to lose a lot in the unlikely event of requiring more than three years of care, place a high value on the additional insurance. At all wealth percentiles, willingness to pay for the three partnership policies is very similar. The very wealthy have a slight preference for the $241 daily benefit total protection policy.
The very wealthy also prefer the unlimited duration non-partnership policy to a partnership policy with the same level of benefits. This is because the unlimited duration policy protects both assets and income, whereas the partnership policy protects only assets, and in the case of the $158 daily benefit policy, only protects assets up to the amount of policy benefits.
An important implication of this finding is that the very wealthy may continue to purchase nonpartnership policies rather than switching to partnership policies, reducing the deadweight cost of the program.
14 Women. The patterns among women exhibit many similarities with men but also some differences. Women have a higher willingness to pay for all policies, reflecting unisex pricing and a higher risk of requiring care. Women have a positive willingness to pay for the three-year duration $158 daily benefit and unlimited duration $241 daily benefit policies at the 60 th and 63 rd percentile, respectively, compared with the 71 st and 72 nd for men. At the highest wealth percentiles, women have a substantially higher willingness to pay for the total protection partnership policy than for either of the other two partnership policies. But, as in the case of men, wealthy women prefer an unlimited duration non-partnership policy to a partnership policy with the same benefit level.
In results that are not reported, we calculate willingness to pay at a 1 percent real interest rate. Individuals place a lower value on all types of long-term care insurance, reflecting their preference for higher consumption earlier in retirement at lower real rates of return.
We now calculate the impact of the partnership programs on the Medicaid share of the expected present value (EPV) of total long-term care expenditures. The eight columns of Table   1 report the Medicaid share under the assumptions of 1) no private insurance; 2) a typical nonpartnership policy with 3-year duration of coverage and $158 daily benefit; 3) a non-partnership policy with unlimited duration of coverage and $158 daily benefit; 4) a three year duration nonpartnership policy with $241 daily benefit; 5) an unlimited duration non-partnership policy with $241 daily benefit; 6) a dollar-for-dollar partnership policy with $158 daily benefit for three years; 7) a dollar-for-dollar partnership policy with $241 daily benefit for three years; and 8) a total asset protection partnership policy with $241 daily benefit for three years. All policies provide 5 percent inflation protection.
In Patterns among women are similar to those among men, except that the Medicaid share of the EPV of long-term care costs is consistently higher at all ages and for all wealth percentiles. This is because women are at greater risk of requiring an extended period of long-term care.
The seven columns of Table 2 show the implicit Medicaid tax on each of the seven policies, defined as the change in the EPV of Medicaid expenditures resulting from the purchase of long-term care insurance, divided by the EPV of the gross benefits from the insurance policy.
In the lower wealth deciles, non-partnership policies are subject to a very high implicit tax because, in the absence of long-term care insurance, Medicaid would cover almost all long-term care costs. The implicit tax on the partnership policy is almost identical, because these households have almost no assets to be protected. At high wealth percentiles, the partnership policies are subject to a negative implicit tax because purchase of the policy increases the EPV of Medicaid benefits. For instance, consider a female at the 90 th percentile of the wealth distribution. The EPV of her lifetime long-term care costs is $65,280. If she does not purchase insurance, the EPV of her Medicaid claim is 10.5 percent of this amount, or $6,842. If she purchases a total asset protection partnership policy with an EPV of benefits of $36,896, the EPV of the amount Medicaid will contribute increases to $18,719, resulting in a minus 32 percent implicit tax. Table 3 shows the net loads on the seven insurance policies. The net load equals one minus the EPV of policy benefits minus the EPV of the Medicaid benefits foregone, plus the EPV of any increased Medicaid benefits receivable by reason of the more generous asset protection rules resulting from the purchase of the policy, divided by the EPV of premiums.
Consider again a woman at the 90 th wealth percentiles, purchasing a total asset protection policy.
The EPV of policy benefits is $36,896. In the absence of insurance, the EPV of her Medicaid costs is $6,842. But after she has purchased insurance, the EPV of her Medicaid benefits increases to $18,719. So the overall benefit of the policy is $48,773. The EPV of premiums is $34,873, yielding a net load of minus 39.9 percent.
For both men and women, the partnership program has a negligible effect on net loads at low wealth levels. At high wealth levels, the effect is much greater for women than for men and is greater for the total asset protection policy that for the dollar-for-dollar policy. The greatest impact on loads is for high-wealth women purchasing total asset protection policies.
We then investigate the potential impact of the partnership program on long-term care insurance and Medicaid finances. This will depend on 1) the number of people who are induced to purchase partnership policies, 2) the number of people who switch from non-partnership to partnership policies, and 3) the impact of participation on the amounts these groups claim under
Medicaid. There are an almost infinite number of combinations of policy benefits that individuals could choose. A fully optimizing model would consider all policy options for all points on the wealth distribution, a task that is computationally infeasible.
We therefore make two alternative simplifying assumptions. In the first alternative, we assume that, prior to the partnership program, individuals purchase the typical policy, one that provides a $158 daily benefit for three years, if willingness to pay exceeds zero. After the introduction of the partnership program, individuals purchase a $158 daily benefit dollar-fordollar policy if willingness to pay exceeds zero, with those who would have previously purchased a non-partnership policy switching to the partnership policy.
In the second alternative, we assume that, prior to the introduction of the partnership programs, individuals purchase the non-partnership policy with the highest willingness to pay among four possible policy types, subject to willingness to pay being greater than zero. After the introduction of the partnership programs, they purchase whichever of all seven policies has the highest willingness to pay. Some but not all of those who would have purchased a nonpartnership policy before the introduction of the program switch to a partnership policy. The first alternative takes account of the observed preferences of existing purchasers, whereas the second alternative assumes fully optimizing behavior, given the policy types included in our analysis and our assumed preference parameters.
Under to those who would purchase non-partnership policy anyway.
Conclusions
We construct an intertemporal optimization model of the long-term care insurance purchase decision faced by single individuals. Assuming plausible preference parameters, we conclude that typical partnership programs would increase long-term care insurance coverage rates by 5 percent and 4 percent for single males and single females, respectively. A substantial part of the subsidy would go to those who would have purchased coverage anyway, and many induced purchasers are at relatively low risk of becoming Medicaid eligible. We estimate that each one-dollar saving in Medicaid costs requires partnership subsidies of $1.68 to $2.30 for single males and $4.10 to $5.38 for single females.
The finding of our simulation model that the programs are unlikely to reduce Medicaid costs, inclusive of the cost of the subsidy, is consistent with the empirical findings of Courtemanche and He (2009 ), Shah Goda (2011 ), Chan and Sun (2011 , and Lin and Prince (2012) . These findings are subject to two caveats. First, the Brown and Finkelstein (2008) model predicts that willingness to pay becomes positive at the 70 th percentile of the male and 60 th percentile of the female wealth distributions. If individuals were rational and well-informed, and 16 Prior to the introduction of the partnership program, all men who purchase long-term care insurance opt for an unlimited duration policy. Thus, the Medicaid share of costs is zero. In contrast, women from the 60 th to the 64 th percentiles opt for a 3-year duration policy while those above the 64 th percentile opt for and an unlimited duration policy. the model captured all relevant aspects of their insurance purchase decision, we might expect to observe coverage rates of about one-third. In reality, coverage rates hover around 10 percent. It is possible that the partnership program may increase the salience of the decision to purchase long-term care insurance, leading to a greater increase in coverage than predicted by our model. Our second caveat is that it might be possible to design a subsidy that targeted only those currently unwilling to purchase insurance. In our stylized model, this is quite straightforward.
One would simply restrict the subsidy to individuals with assets below the threshold at which purchase becomes optimal. In reality, the purchase decision is influenced by unobservable factors. It would be necessary to apply restrictive conditions to exclude those who would purchase anyway, thereby substantially reducing take-up. 
